I don't know that I find these arguments very convincing. In particular, I don't find the foundations of the argument to be considerate of the contradictions I think exist, and I don't find them to be understanding enough of non-realist, non-physicalist ontologies to sufficiently refute them; the conclusions reached in their refutation do not seem logical to me.
There seems to be a reliance on certain assumptions about language and thought that I do not share based on my prior reading, which made this a bit difficult to read and understand at times.
It is on step 3 of your argument that I find the argument becomes confusing and collapses: "The assumption of an external explanation implies realism."
"An instance of this objection would be Hegel’s absolute idealism [...] such an objection would introduce the factor of objective efficacy of intentions, divine or otherwise, in the very forming and structuring objects [...] such an efficacy cannot itself be an arbitrary objective effect of an intention, nor can it be identified with the intention as such, but must be thought of as something like a universal."
I suppose I don't see your objection to why it cannot—why? This universal does not seem necessary, and what is universal needn't be objective; especially if one considers an ontology based on objective idealism or cosmopsychism.
Re: protolanguage, perhaps the leading researchers into it—as well as antilanguage pioneers—of forgottenlanguages dot org infamy seem to have a stance contrary to nearly all of the ones expressed here, rooted philosophically in objective idealism and multidisciplinary science.
Their ideas of language are different, and I have to say make a lot of sense to me, although what I find to make sense I have found a great challenge to do so—possessing by no means a bias in its favour (if anything, against it)—as I very much originally leaned toward physicalist realism.
I'd be interested in what you'd have to say about some of what they write in the following linked exchange, such as their points on the limiting factors of language and the real vs the construct?
"Your hypothesis that languages are capable of pointing to real things rather than construct concepts/reality, is challenged by quantum logic, in the sense that we do not know what reality is or, at least, we agree that things out there can be differently interpreted by different observers [NB: this is shown even by special relativity]. Therefore, we lack a solid concept of what is real and what is not. Usually, you navigate this problem by using deictic ontology, that is, by pointing to a tree and assigning a label to that object, a label called tree. Any speaker of any language will use a different label, but pointing at the same object makes mutual intelligibility possible for all speakers. However, what happens when you face a phenomenon, an event, or even an object which is totally new and unknown to each and every human? Language collapses, understanding fades away, and logic blows up. This is a known problem in quantum logic, and a serious and deep problem having to do with mind/matter interaction and the very essence of reality and being."
A relevant short summary regarding some of the 'quantum logic' in case you are unfamiliar with what is meant by it or the direction this might be pointing understanding of reality toward:
This subject is way outside my field of knowledge, but I vaguely recall reading long ago some research about the possibility that the links between sounds and meaning are what facilitates early language acquisition when an infant is building a vocabulary of words but not yet producing even two-word proto-sentences. And here's a link to an article from 2015 that you may find relevant. https://www.academia.edu/43614763/Synaesthetic_sound_iconicity_Phonosemantic_associations_between_acoustic_features_of_phonemes_and_emotional_behavior
Very sorry for your loss 😊🙏
I don't know that I find these arguments very convincing. In particular, I don't find the foundations of the argument to be considerate of the contradictions I think exist, and I don't find them to be understanding enough of non-realist, non-physicalist ontologies to sufficiently refute them; the conclusions reached in their refutation do not seem logical to me.
There seems to be a reliance on certain assumptions about language and thought that I do not share based on my prior reading, which made this a bit difficult to read and understand at times.
It is on step 3 of your argument that I find the argument becomes confusing and collapses: "The assumption of an external explanation implies realism."
"An instance of this objection would be Hegel’s absolute idealism [...] such an objection would introduce the factor of objective efficacy of intentions, divine or otherwise, in the very forming and structuring objects [...] such an efficacy cannot itself be an arbitrary objective effect of an intention, nor can it be identified with the intention as such, but must be thought of as something like a universal."
I suppose I don't see your objection to why it cannot—why? This universal does not seem necessary, and what is universal needn't be objective; especially if one considers an ontology based on objective idealism or cosmopsychism.
E.g.: https://www.bernardokastrup.com/2016/01/on-why-idealism-is-superior-to.html
Re: protolanguage, perhaps the leading researchers into it—as well as antilanguage pioneers—of forgottenlanguages dot org infamy seem to have a stance contrary to nearly all of the ones expressed here, rooted philosophically in objective idealism and multidisciplinary science.
Their ideas of language are different, and I have to say make a lot of sense to me, although what I find to make sense I have found a great challenge to do so—possessing by no means a bias in its favour (if anything, against it)—as I very much originally leaned toward physicalist realism.
I'd be interested in what you'd have to say about some of what they write in the following linked exchange, such as their points on the limiting factors of language and the real vs the construct?
https://sasamilic.medium.com/my-emails-with-ayndryl-5babec2a79a8
"Your hypothesis that languages are capable of pointing to real things rather than construct concepts/reality, is challenged by quantum logic, in the sense that we do not know what reality is or, at least, we agree that things out there can be differently interpreted by different observers [NB: this is shown even by special relativity]. Therefore, we lack a solid concept of what is real and what is not. Usually, you navigate this problem by using deictic ontology, that is, by pointing to a tree and assigning a label to that object, a label called tree. Any speaker of any language will use a different label, but pointing at the same object makes mutual intelligibility possible for all speakers. However, what happens when you face a phenomenon, an event, or even an object which is totally new and unknown to each and every human? Language collapses, understanding fades away, and logic blows up. This is a known problem in quantum logic, and a serious and deep problem having to do with mind/matter interaction and the very essence of reality and being."
A relevant short summary regarding some of the 'quantum logic' in case you are unfamiliar with what is meant by it or the direction this might be pointing understanding of reality toward:
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-universe-is-not-locally-real-and-the-physics-nobel-prize-winners-proved-it/