The Ukraine endgame

Long-term goals of parties involved

As we’re now entering a new phase in the ongoing conflict, it’s appropriate to review the initial long-term goals of the states and major institutions involved, as well as what their intended outcomes are likely to be in light of the developments of the past six months.

There’s a widespread tendency throughout alternative media towards entirely discounting any and all rational intentions on part of the NATO bloc. The process tends to be reduced to an ill-considered expression of the structural remnants of US imperialism with little in the way of a pragmatic assessment of mid- and long-term goals. This is of course also mirrored in Western MSM:s proposition that the entire Russian Federation is being piloted by an insane autocrat whose actions are utterly incomprehensible.

This is of course nonsensical. To assume that the actual planners on either side of the conflict are mainly acting irrationally, and/or lack basic information available to anyone with a smartphone is not a viable assumption. That, for instance, the effects of Western sanctions in terms of energy availability or food prices would not have been foreseen by the available intelligence services and strategic analysts is out of the question.

With this in mind, I’ll here attempt an overview of the situation from the perspective of the various parties involved, with an eye to their likely intentions and long-term goals.

A basic premise here will be that this conflict, just like every other conflict throughout history, relates to the control of resources. This might seem platitudinous to anyone who’s ever opened a book, but since it’s omitted in almost all mainstream approaches to the situation, I will be quite explicit in making this particular connection.

NATO’s initial set of goals

Background

We cannot being to understand this situation while leaving out the biophysical economy.

The world in general, and the West in particular, are namely currently facing a lasting structural energy and resource crisis. Even without depletion, the meaningfully recoverable energy assets on Western territories are scarce. While reserves are often played up with the help of comparatively high-cost, low-yield resources like shale, the net energy return of these assets are insufficient to provide for a functioning industrial economy:

The most reliable studies suggest that the EROI for oil shale falls between 1:1 and 2:1 when self-energy is counted as a cost. Self-energy is energy released by the oil shale conversion process that is used to power that operation. This places the EROI for oil shale considerably below the EROI of about 20:1 for conventional crude oil at the wellhead. This conclusion holds for both the crude product and refined fuel stages of processing. Even in its depleted state—smaller and deeper fields, depleted natural drive mechanisms, etc.—conventional crude oil generates a significantly larger energy surplus than oil shale (Cleveland, C. O’Connor, P. (2010) “An Assessment of the Energy Return on Investment (EROI) of Oil Shale”).

From “List of oil fields”, Wikipedia,

Oil fields proper, such as the ones illustrated above, provide a much higher yield in relation to the necessary energy investments, and are in effect the only petroleum resource that really counts.

An in-depth EROI analysis reveals that they also are the only energy resource that really counts (see Hall, C., Klitgaard, H. (2018). Energy and the Wealth of Nations.).

This is, however, incredibly counter-intuitive in relation to the contemporary narratives around a “green reset” that characterize Western political discourse. The implicit and unquestionable assumption here is the feasibility of a transition to renewables that fully replaces fossil fuels.

This assumption is quite provably false, and the debates around energy security during the last 20 years or so, provides ample evidence that this fact is readily apparent to Western planners and decision-makers.

However, most people, and on all sides of the political spectra at that, take as a matter of fact that we with more or less trouble could swap out the industrial economy’s fossil energy for some neat and clean hi-tech renewables and keep business as usual going.

This notion undercuts what’s probably the most important factor in explaining and understanding the Ukraine conflict and the bigger picture around it.

If the West has no real use for Russian fossil fuels, this “gas station masquerading as a country”, as John McCain tellingly put it, any suggestion of NATO expansion eastward really becomes nonsensical. Then other explanations for the process, such as the peripheral ex-soviets’ voluntary accession to these paragons of peace and prosperity for all, become at least conceivable as important.

Yet the real reason for active opinion-building all over the West towards further escalating this conflict, is unfortunately mirrored in McCain’s sentiment above. We simply need that gas station to fuel our SUVs.

The West is in the mid-term entirely dependent on access to these energy assets, and not least those proximate to Russian territory (and under its influence) in Central Asia and the Arctic region, and Western polities can simply not take the risk to be dependent on energy imports from anything but immediate puppet states.

That would quite literally be a knife at their throats (which renders most other suggested rationales behind NATO:s involvement, such as arms sales, secondary at best).

This has of course been well known for many decades, and Russia has been in focus in relation to energy security for a long time. The German Bundeswehr raised the alarm for more than 12 years ago, painting the situation as very dire, and provided a clear security analysis with Russia at its centre (italics are mine):

https://cdn.permaculturenews.org/files/Peak%20Oil_Study%20EN.pdf

"Should [peak oil] happen, Russia, with its already considerable supply quantities could become the focus of attention. Although, in general, Russia’s vast reserves could make up for the failure of other suppliers to deliver oil to Germany, a further increase in Russian deliveries may tip the existing relationship – which is currently emphasised as being largely mutual – in favour of Russia and put a strain on the relationship with other customers along the pipeline" (Ibid., 65).

"Already today, Russia's foreign policy calculus, for example, includes energy aspects and the option to use them in order to enforce Russian interests. At the strategic level, this is reflected in Moscow's Foreign Policy Concept of July 2008. In practice, Russia's gas disputes with Ukraine are an indication of a political instrumentalisation of its energy riches. A similar connection between an offensive foreign policy and energy richness can be observed for Venezuela and Iran. Against the background of global peak oil, such trends will probably escalate drastically" (Ibid., 25).

"... As a conditio sine qua non for expanding economic supremacy, energy becomes considerably more important for global power shifts in the international system in light of peak oil" (Ibid., 33).

"It is still unclear whether NATO will play a role in possible conflicts over Arctic resources; however, all adjacent states, with the exception of Russia, are members of the Alliance. This may imply the involvement of the Transatlantic Alliance in territorial conflicts of one or several member states with another state not belonging to the Alliance ..." (Ibid., 41).

"In the long term, however, reorganisation in order to substitute declining European production as well as partnerships with non-European countries are needed. For this, the relationship with Russia is above all essential for Germany’s oil and gas supply alignment" (Ibid., 66).

and finally:

"In this context, it may be necessary to consider whether and how the European and Transatlantic security architectures could be adapted accordingly. A common European strategy towards this neighbour and its claim to superpower status as well as a concerted external energy policy could reduce the danger of Russia exploiting energy deliveries for power politics and of a corresponding intra-European potential for political division" (Ibid., 68).

US analysts have of course raised these issues much earlier.

The following are excerpts from a 2006 congressional testimony, “Assessing Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia” by representatives from the US defense and security think tank, the Centre for Strategic and International studies, with the topic of US “energy security in Central Asia” (reflect upon that notion):

"Russia, too, has been active in trying to establish by commerce the dominance it used to enjoy by force.

Russia’s appetite for control of petroleum resources in the region is barely concealed. The reality is that most Central Asia petroleum—after transit through Russia—is on its way to the West, and in light of the winter cutoff of Ukraine, this fact should give us some pause for thought.

Moreover, the regimes that have emerged since the end of the Soviet Union are, broadly speaking, friendly kleptocracies. Every one of them has adopted a government model built around what is politely referred to as a ‘‘strongman,’’ a position commonly known as a dictator.

...

On the United States energy interests in Central Asia, I think we see Central Asia energy infrastructure and resources once again becoming a source of competition for great powers. In this new rush, the two most important regional players are China and Russia. Energy-hungry China is actively working to reach long-term oil and gas agreements, and has billions of dollars to spend in order to obtain them. Russia is also spending considerable sums in the region in order to ensure it can maintain its monopoly over Caspian gas transportation to Western markets.

...

Russia clearly won the first round of Central Asian gas competition. While the United States backed a trans-Caspian gas pipeline to transport Turkmen gas via an undersea pipeline to Azerbaijan and, from there, via Georgia, Turkey and onwards to European markets, Russia was able to finalize a gas pipeline agreement with Turkey to send its gas via Turkey via the Blue Stream gas pipeline underneath the Black Sea.

...

Yet, this too may not materialize unless the United States is seriously committed to changing the energy dynamics in Eurasia, which ultimately means confrontation with Russia’s regional energy strategy. To come up with a coherent and pragmatic strategy, it is necessary to look at the broader Eurasian energy picture, specifically at the activities and plans of Gazprom.

While many have wanted to turn a blind eye to the possibility that United States and Russia may not have a win-win option in Central Asian energy, it is clear that Russia is playing it all.

There is no win-win strategy possible with Russia and Central Asia regarding energy given the Kremlin’s use of energy as a political weapon and Gazprom’s need to obtain as much of the Central Asian gas as it can to keep Russian domestic gas prices low and to provide uninterrupted gas supply to its European consumers.

The United States has two options, it can either give up, which is not advisable, or it can become directly engaged at the top levels on this issue."

I think this background is quite clear enough, especially and most emphatically in light of the urgency of passing the actual peak of oil production in concert with multiple other resource bottlenecks. This last set of quotes are as strong as can be, and they’re from way back in -06, i.e. when real supply disruptions were more or less an abstraction.

NATO:s and Russia’s objectives at the outset of conflict

Escalation towards actual military conflict between states was most likely not an intended outcome of the West’s initial interference in Ukraine or other adjacent polities during the 00s, even if this naturally would have been a foreseen possibility.

The most favourable outcome before the 2014 coup would rather simply have been to successfully circumscribe Russian influence in the region, particularly in relation to the energy security issues recounted in e.g. the Bundeswehr report and the 2006 congressional testimony.

Subvert key states and statelets to effectively lock out Russia from significant markets and areas of transit and production so that a stable hegemony could be maintained. The “color revolutions” a well-known case in point.

From “Color revolution”, Wikipedia

Compare the above image to the previous oil field map. Preferably also include pipelines and important points of transit.

The Russian response to these interventions, however, precluded much of the success of this incremental hacking away at its regional hegemony. This was early on exemplified by the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and Russia’s annexation of border buffer regions.

After Russia’s successful maneuvering in response to the attempted subversion of Ukraine, and the subsequent return of Yanukovich, a more forceful Western approach was likely deemed necessary.

The overall situation also saw a Russian push towards erecting independent energy markets and establishing increased strategic cooperation with regional players, which probably was incendiary. In a peak oil situation with close cooperation between Russia, China, and producers in the Caspian region on independent energy markets, Western economies would be extremely vulnerable. Add to that a strengthened Middle Eastern hegemony by an Iran aligned with the aforementioned powers, and we have a very unfortunate scenario for the NATO parties.

Conventional warfare was of course out of the question, so the historically often quite successful proxy approach becomes an immediate option. After Vicky “Fuck the EU” Nuland’s 2014 coup, which rendered Ukraine a NATO asset, NATO accordingly found itself with the capability of exerting significant pressure on Russia. The positioning of tactical missiles, the strangling of Russia’s southern defense capabilities and main warm water port through wresting away Crimea, as well as the option of a rapid nuclear first-strike onto Russian territory, would have been quite the set of bargaining chips.

The subsequent Russian annexation of Crimea and effective creation of the breakaway buffer republics, however, meant that a protracted conventional proxy conflict between Russia and Ukraine became the best option in terms of destabilizing Russia politically.

The mid-term goal here is, just as regards the US campaigns in the Middle East, nothing less than regime change in Russia, and the installation of a Western-friendly administration:

Diminishing the belief of Russians in the legitimacy of the means by which their leaders acquire power has the potential to increase discontent with the regime, leading to protests, lack of cooperation with the government, greater emigration of skilled workers and academics, and other events that could distract or weaken the regime. In an extreme case, such a strategy could theoretically lead to regime change … (RAND Corp. (2019). “Extending Russia”. RAND corp report discussing efforts towards undermining Russian public institutions and regional hegemony).

So how is such a proxy conflict best employed here? Well, after extensively arming, supporting and training the Ukraine military forces, a reasonable initial objective on the part of NATO would be to simply reassert control over the contested territories. Retake annexed Crimea and the Donbas and reintegrate them into Ukraine, first with a low-intensity destabilization of said regions, and if necessary, with a full invasion in accordance with international law, and backed by the “international community”.

Contrariwise, Russia’s immediate objectives after the 2014 coup would naturally have been to maintain the annexed key territories and rapidly negotiate an internationally recognized peace agreement, which was also attempted several times, not least in terms of the Minsk agreements.

This is, incidentally, also a case in point. The Minsk agreements, which did not preclude Ukrainian NATO accession, would very likely have been acceptable to the West if the goal simply was to contain Russia. In the post-2014 situation, the main part of Ukraine made up a very useful buffer region, counterbalancing Russian hegemony, and whose military capabilities and strategic location would serve as an excellent deterrent for any and all Russian military aggression.

The fact that this was not the case speaks volumes towards something like the objectives recounted above.

The successful violent recapture of Crimea and the Donbas would likely also go a long way to support regime change in Russia, not only due to the loss of face, but also since these regions have very significant Russian populations, leading to public demoralization.

If, on the other hand, Russia responds militarily (as in fact did happen), then the door is opened to heavy sanctions, coordinated propaganda campaigns against the Russian public and other overt acts of subversion, a regional NATO military buildup and the accession of new and strategically important member states (e.g. Sweden and Finland) due to the ostensible emergency, and, of course, a protracted proxy war or insurgency sapping Russian resources, manpower and political will.

And this is where we now seem to find ourselves.

The parties’ likely current objectives

At the moment of this writing, the conflict has dragged out over seven months, with sanctions and disrupted markets ushering in a bona fide energy crisis in Europe, enormous inflationary pressure across the sphere of Western economies, and, of course, almost unprecedented levels of starvation in the third world that our mainstream media somehow fails to mention.

Russia’s initial ambition of a quick and clean military intervention and a toppling of the Ukrainian regime (the Russo-Georgian war was over in just under two weeks) has quite obviously failed, and it’s been dragged into a protracted semi-conventional conflict. The Russian Federation’s current activities seem to reflect a recognition of the inevitability of a long war, and a preparation for an escalation in the short term. The mobilization of 300 000 troops is a clear step in this direction, as is the pushing through of a full integration of the DPR and the NPR into Russia proper, which means that pretexts for defensive military operations anchored in international law will be invoked in response to any further Ukraine/NATO efforts to recapture the eastern buffer territories.

Since this mobilization will take some time to materialize, probably on the order of months, there’s a window of opportunity for the Ukrainian forces to pressure the Russians before opposition significantly stiffens. The recent minor successes will most likely be followed by NATO upping the ante and pushing for effective incursions into the Donbas before proper defences can be mounted. And, importantly, before the referendums translate into the breakaway republics’ full annexation into Russia proper.

After that fact, any further aggression towards them will be framed as an act of war against Russia, which means significant escalation that may well spiral out of anyone’s control.

The mobilization will also likely alter the internal political atmosphere of Russia, setting society in general towards something more akin to a “war footing”. This may both exacerbate tensions and cause further polarization as well as having a consolidating effect on public morale and sentiment.

Meanwhile, Europe is facing an increasingly difficult situation. Inflation is rampant, and the industry and business sectors are taking quite a beating. Some analysts are even speaking of deindustrialization, which is an exaggeration, but the tendency is clear enough. Europe’s energy outlook is already dire. With only a partial reduction in imported gas and petroleum, we’re looking forward to a winter without enough fossil fuels to actually keep our economies running. In December, moreover, the oil embargo escalates with a price cap on Russian exports, which seems to coincide with a Chinese re-opening of its economy after the recent round of covid lockdowns. The likely result is an oil supply shock and spiking prices at about the worst possible time.

As the situation further unravels, the leaders of Europe’s various states may well find themselves facing significant pressure by increasingly popular opposition groups, something exemplified by the results of the recent Swedish and Italian elections.

Renegotiated relationships with both Russia and the US may very well be the outcome, yet the stranglehold of US propaganda is almost immutable, not least among the working class.

And in relation to my introductory remarks above, I think it’s impossible for either party to back down here. The West literally needs to break Russia and wrest control of the resources under its hegemony. Facing sanction-related energy shortages and economic instability in the short term is a small price to pay, and with every pundit and mid-level politician parroting the same line on how sacrifices need to be made, cohesion might be possible to maintain.

Indirectly, neutralizing Russia would also render China, which is heavily dependent on Russian resources, much less of a geopolitical threat. More might pivot around Ukraine than is commonly realized.

In turn, Russia and China are now scrambling to establish or deepen strategic alliances with other parties, such as India, Brazil, Venezuela, Iran &c, especially in relation to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union, the former of which produced a set of quite defiant joint statements during a mid-September summit.