Conspiracies or emergent institutional behaviour?

On the sociology of deep politics pt. 1

Structural determinism vs. agential influence

Fellow covidologist Eugyppius recently posted a piece where he reflected on the relative roles of actual intentional agents and emergent social processes in explaining how processes such as the COVID event materialize.

In other words, to what extent are they the result of the deliberate actions of groups and individuals rather than the chaotic and unpredictable effects of interconnected complex systems?

Structural causes

Eugyppius positioned himself pretty close to the latter extreme here (although without being reductive), stating that we should focus on the structural reasons for these types of phenomena, rather than the malicious intent of some particular set of persons. The line of reasoning alluded to here relates to the capricious outcomes of sufficiently complex systems. Even when they are strictly deterministic, very small changes in the initial values or attributes can lead to wildly divergent results, meaning that the outcomes over time are more or less unpredictable. Thus, while there exist an abundance of various plots among the influential strata of society, the vast majority of these will not attain their objectives, and for those who do over time, it was rather a matter of chance than effective strategizing.

One could say that, according to this sort of hypothesis, we have a strong structural determinism in terms of the outcomes of complex societal processes. Structural causal monism would be a way to phrase its most extreme form in philosophical jargon.

This is an important point, and should give us pause in relation to overly simplistic explanations based in assumptions of nefarious masterminding. Eugyppius also finds support for his general position in everything from most interpretations of Marxist historical materialism to the process-oriented analyses of luminaries such as John Michael Greer or the Turchin cycle set of models.

The role of effective agency

Yet the opposing perspective is not without its rationale. Considering the other extreme, which we then could frame as a strong intentional determinism, with something along the lines of agential causal monism as its pure variant, it could respond by trying to circumvent the predictability issues in a couple of ways.

First of all, the agent advocate could argue that short- to mid-term predictability is not a problem in principle. Even if outcomes over time will not be foreseeable in practice, it’s still feasible to make assumptions with a very high degree of probability, and to act accordingly, if we’re just dealing with shorter time spans. And then you just rinse and repeat.

The other type of counter-argument would simply establish other rigid and entirely comprehensible causal influences apart from the complex structural processes in play, which either override the latter, or exert enough of an influence to render outcomes and strategic actions sufficiently predictable over time.

Candidates for such causal influences are many, but a few plausible ones are for instance sociological meta-structures that change very slowly (these can in turn be cashed out in a variety of ways, e.g. in relation to ideology or the inherent teleologies of technological systems); stable and strongly influential complexes of ideas such as myths and worldviews; or even immutable Platonic or Aristotelian forms.

Synthesis

All the same, I don’t think the two types of explanation are in any sort of deep conflict. I very much like to hedge my bets and throw out platitudes such that”the answer lies somewhere in between”, or “maybe it’s a little of both”. Comes with the territory of being a dualist, I guess. Especially in this particular case.

And to that effect, one good example of the actual interplay between both of these levels or types of causal relationships I think is found in the mediatic institution of advertising campaigns.

The ad campaign is a form of propaganda closely related to agitprop. It broadcasts a message in a complex and chaotic informational environment that plays on received prejudices, affections and narratives, it generally wants to generate action, and its success is far from certain. It may even have an immediate detrimental effect on sales such as the marketing of New Coke in the 80s, which is a fascinating example of how an advertising campaign actually clashed with brand loyalty and consumer identity. It didn’t matter that focus groups actually liked the new formula better, attachment to the product was too strong for changes to be tolerated.

All of this, however, paved the way for the reintroduction of the old formula and a rebranding of the soft drink to “Coca-Cola Classic”, which in the end boosted sales and significantly reinforced the brand’s position.

So there’s unpredictability here, but we also clearly see that there are identifiable factors in play that do not really reduce to the erratic interplay of complex structural processes. The conservative brand attachment was already in place as a complex interrelation between people’s worldviews, values, experiences and identities. This attachment can’t be cashed out as a purely emergent phenomenon within just the time frame and informational environment of the ad campaign, but must be regarded as a deeper causal factor of a non-transient nature that significantly influenced the outcome.

As Ellul argues in his classical work on propaganda, all effective efforts at mass persuasion must successfully employ these types of stable, fundamental causal factors from the realm of ideas, so as to render the desired actions or outcomes a clear affirmation of these deeply held convictions and values:

Propaganda in its explicit form must relate solely to what is timely . Man can be captured and mobilized only if there is consonance between his own deep social beliefs and those underlying the propaganda directed at him, and he will be aroused and moved to action only if the propaganda pushes him toward a timely action. These two elements are not contradictory but complementary, for the only interesting and enticing news is that which presents a timely, spectacular aspect of society’s profound reality. A man will become excited over a new automobile because it is immediate evidence of his deep belief in progress and technology. Between news that can be utilized by propaganda and fundamental currents of society the same relationship exists as between waves and the sea. The waves exist only because the underlying mass supports them; without it there would be nothing. But man sees only the waves; they are what attracts, entices, and fascinates him. Through them he grasps the grandeur and majesty of the sea, though this grandeur exists only in the immense mass of water. Similarly, propaganda can have solid reality and power over man only because of its rapport with fundamental currents, but it has seductive excitement and a capacity to move him only by its ties to the most volatile immediacy. And the timely event that man considers worth retaining, preserving, and disseminating is always an event related to the expression of the myths and presuppositions of a given time and place (Ellul, 1965).

Clearly, this sometimes works, and as stated, I would argue that these factors do not reduce to the unpredictable interplay of complex social processes (at least not in the short term), meaning they are relatively stable and comprehensible factors that exert a more or less calculable influence which may be strategically exploited.

To be sure, there’s a whole lot of unpredictability in play here, and I would not want to reject that obviously relevant structural level of causal explanation, but I think the responses available to the advocate for effective agential causation or process guidance at least sometimes make meaningful strategizing both feasible and probable.

In other words, even though the basic preconditions are mainly structural, I would argue that well-placed “deep events” really can change the trajectories of social and historical processes in both sufficiently predictable and profound ways.

Especially if you’re positioned to take advantage of the ensuing momentum.

References

Ellul, Jacques, Propaganda, New York: Vintage Books 1965